- Antivirus symantec endpoint drivers#
- Antivirus symantec endpoint Patch#
- Antivirus symantec endpoint code#
Your subscription begins when your purchase is completed (or otherwise, when your payment is received). Check out the included IDLs for where to switch out the GUID.Īdditional usage details can be found in the project’s README file.įusionX is Accenture Security’s elite red team focused on executing sophisticated attacks against our clients in order to simulate the actions of an advanced adversary.*Important Subscription, Pricing and Offer Details: A channel can register as many command handlers as it needs. Each channel then registers a command handler which allows it to serve requests dynamically during invocation. Connecting to an RPC endpoint can be done via the standard win32 RPCRT4 functions, details of which can be found in the CreateBindingHandle function of the accompanying source code.Ī channel registers itself at runtime with ccIPC.dll, which acts as the RPC server loaded by the system service. The above was truncated for brevity, but there are approximately 37 channels registered across the five RPC endpoints. The current endpoints can be extracted from the registry:Įach endpoint has channels registered to it, which can also be extracted from the registry: These are represented by GUIDs that are dynamically generated each time the service is started. In addition to these function calls, the RPC server registers five different endpoints. This must be passed to each RPC function for a call to succeed. LpHandle will now contain a context handle. To get a handle, we send an appropriately crafted buffer to the Proc0 function: We first need to generate and send a unique GUID to the service which will then use it to track our session. In our case, Proc0 is the function used to obtain a context handle. You can read more about RPC context handles on MSDN here. This allows ccSvcHost to track state information in between RPC calls, whether they’re direct to the RPC server, COM, or through some other transport. In order to call these, we first must obtain a context handle. It registers six functions, as described by the following IDL: Our vulnerability begins with ccSvcHst’s exposed RPC server, which can be connected to by any authenticated local user. Antivirus symantec endpoint drivers#
It additionally interfaces with the approximately 13 different kernel drivers loaded by the application via IO control codes. The ccSvcHst service has a variety of input surfaces, including COM objects (both LocalServer and InprocServer), RPC endpoints, TCP ports, extended service control codes, and others. This privileged service, ccSvcHst, is SEP’s local hivemind and handles the execution of all scanning, configuration, isolation, etc. Nearly all requests are proxied back to ccSvcHst through COM objects for processing. SymCorpUI is the userland GUI used to interface with SEP, inspect policy, start scans, and make changes to the local instance. While there have been some architectural changes since this minor version, they are not substantive enough to change much in the above diagram. AnalysisĪt a high level, SEP’s architecture can be described by the following diagram:Īll analysis was performed using version. This bug was discovered independently by our FusionX R&D team and disclosed to ZDI by z0mb1e in early 2020.
Antivirus symantec endpoint Patch#
Most systems should have automatically patched by now but users are urged to patch immediately. This bug was disclosed via ZDI as ZDI-20-228 and CVE-2020-5825, fixed in version.
Antivirus symantec endpoint code#
An arbitrary file move allows users to move files from one controlled location to another, which can be exploited to obtain arbitrary code execution under the SYSTEM context. This can be exploited by unprivileged local users with the ability to execute arbitrary code. A local privilege escalation vulnerability exists in one of the RPC endpoints exposed by a Symantec Endpoint Protection (SEP) userland service.
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